

THE DEVASTATING DEFEAT

Why Labour lost and how it can win again

Part 1: Britain's new political divides in the Brexit election



Luke Cooper and Christabel Cooper

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Europe for the Many is a research and events platform established by Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, exploring the challenges facing the left in Europe in the 21st century.

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INTRODUCTION

Laura Parker

Laura Parker is the former National Coordinator of Momentum and was part of Momentum's 2019 general election campaign.

The December 2019 election delivered a devastating result for all who need Britain to change. This report shows that some in the Labour Party have the analysis and ideas necessary to fight back and win the next general election.

The report confirms with hard data what a lot of us already knew about the seats which Labour lost in 2017 and 2019 – not least of all those living in them: they are suffering with low wage, low growth local economies. As much as anyone, the people of these villages, towns and small cities need the radical economic programme which Labour offered. But they didn't vote for it. They voted instead for a party which promised to 'get Brexit done' and against a party in which they often had little faith.

For all its contradictions and limitations I, like many millions of others, wanted to stay in the EU. I know though, that if politics stays centred on the binary Brexit divide, it will be hard for Labour to win. We now have an opportunity to move on from the divisions of Leave-Remain, and an obligation to do so as we focus on holding the Tories to account for the promises that they will fail to deliver. Our energies must be concentrated on opposing Johnson's hard Brexit, his Trump trade deal and fighting for a sensible economic relationship with Europe.

Across the world there is a rise in support for authoritarian politics which Labour must never embrace. Brexit brought these ideas to the centre of British politics. It legitimised and fed right-wing and reactionary social values. Whoever wins the Labour Party leadership, they must determine to lead a party which will never turn its back on migrant workers, our LGBT+ or BAME communities.

Effective opposition starts with seeking to understand and then accept what happened in the election. It



was not Labour's transformative agenda which led to electoral defeat. Labour's bold policies inspired hundreds of thousands of new members into our party from 2015 to 2017 and gave hope to millions of voters. Poll after poll finds there is support across a large majority of the public for radical policies to tackle climate change and inequality and change the way the economy works. It wasn't the policies the voters did not like, it was our party they did not trust. It is now our job to rebuild that trust and credibility as pre-conditions for being elected and governing.

That means taking the very best of the last few years and being honest about where we failed. A bold vision for the future must be matched by convincing and inclusive leadership in the here and now. This matters to our communities, to the voters we need to persuade – and to the party activists we must mobilise to reach them all.

For Labour must reach out and make more confident common cause with its allies. Underpinned by a broad social movement – of trade unions, civil society organisations, community groups – and willing to listen to the criticisms of its friends and the wisdom of its members, a people-powered Labour party can overturn the Tory majority.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the first of a two-part report aimed at understanding the causes of the Labour Party's electoral defeat. In part one we analyse the national data behind the defeat. We draw out the links between social class, economic geography and values in Britain's new political divides. In part two, which will be published separately, we look at 13 individual seats that tell the story of Labour's electoral defeat. We combine this data with interviews, speaking to local Labour Party campaigners, drawing out the organisational and political lessons in their experiences.

Britain's new political divides

Drawing on the data, we group the electoral map into four main categories:

- **Multi-Ethnic Working Class Heartlands.** These are seats that Labour has consistently held despite the losses seen in 2017 and 2019. High levels of inequality, deprivation but also ethnic diversity define these seats.

- **Young Cosmopolitan Centres of the New Capitalism.** These are seats that Labour won for the first time in 2017/2019. They are relatively diverse, have large numbers of private renters and graduates and high house prices.

- **The Brexit Voting Towns of Left Behind Britain.** The Tories won these seats for the first time in 2017/2019. They are areas in decline with low house prices, low wages, low ethnic diversity and high numbers of older people. These seats voted to Leave.

- **The Affluent and Middle Class Conservative Shires.** These are seats that the Tories have consistently held and are not at risk from Labour. They are very affluent, have low ethnic diversity and a large older population. The majority of these seats also voted to Leave.

Higher levels of regional inequality (and inequality *within* regions) have brought about these changes. Economic discontent has been fostered in the Brexit-voting towns and small cities of 'left behind' Britain – a pattern we see in the rise of right wing populism across Europe. In the UK, these places tend to have average levels of home ownership, but low house prices. Wage levels also tend to be lower in these

areas. Middle-income earners in the towns and cities of left behind Britain have not experienced the spending boost that comes with sharply increased house prices. Their local economies are still depressed.

The Tory victory in 2019 is inseparable from Brexit. It built a new politics out of the sluggish economic conditions of left behind Britain. This politics was able to unite the traditional, affluent Tory vote, which also backed Brexit, with a breakaway group from Labour's electoral coalition. Crucially, it brought the divide between values to the centre of British politics. Paradoxically, although changes to the economies of small towns drove Brexit, it led to values and identity rising over class.

Britain is now divided between social liberals (who tended to vote Remain) and social conservatives (who tended to vote Leave). And this division was crucial in the election. The Tories now have a huge challenge. They have to keep control of seats desperate for investment, which look completely different to their consistently held seats, while also keeping their commitment not to raise any taxes over the next five years. We predict that they will combine very socially conservative policies on issues like crime and immigration with pork-barrel politics, targeting these areas for investment by cynically cutting funding to other areas, such as very deprived safe Labour seats.

Many people have argued that Labour lost touch with its working class base. But this isn't accurate. Labour's consistently held seats are areas of high inequality and persistent deprivation. In fact, of the 20 constituencies with the highest level of child poverty in the UK, 19 of them are held by Labour. Workers remain a cornerstone of Labour's coalition.

The changes we describe can be seen as a transformation of the modern working class. Post-industrial society has eroded the traditional relationship between politics and class. This is a longer-term shift going back decades, but it only became obvious electorally with the 2016 Brexit vote and the two subsequent general elections. Both parties now bring together economically diverse and fragmented coalitions of voters.

If debate remains focused on questions of values and identity, this will inevitably benefit the Tories


Fix our broken economics and democracy

The good news for Labour is that there is broad support for the party's economic policy amongst a large majority of the British population. But it will be impossible for Labour to win the next election without winning support from voters with socially conservative views. This is not impossible, especially as many were prepared to vote for Jeremy Corbyn's Labour party as recently as 2017. However, if debate remains focused on questions of values and identity, this will inevitably benefit the Tories.

We make the following simple recommendations to the incoming party leadership:

- **Resist Johnson's Brexit, but move on from Leave/Remain.** Do not adopt a 'rejoin' position. Instead focus on resisting Johnson's Brexit and holding the Tories to account for their failures and showing how Labour will do better.
- **See what works. Adopt an evidence-based approach.** Utilise traditional methods such as focus groups with new techniques like Implicit Response Testing to measure the emotional resonance of key messages. With a professional approach to targeting these lost voters, messages can be carefully honed in ways that make our radical policies appealing.
- **Avoid making shallow appeals to these voters.** Do not adopt insincere slogans or messages like 'one nation Labour' or 'British jobs for British workers'. This is self-defeating, reinforces Tory messaging and risks eroding the Labour coalition. Focus on the economic policy offers that have support.
- **Economics and democracy.** Regional investment, public ownership, the NHS, etc., are all issues with broad appeal. Labour should focus on making this core offer seem credible. And with the idea of political disempowerment a key factor in the Brexit vote, give power back to our communities in a new settlement for our democracy. This can build the 'big tent' of voters that we need to secure the 14m voters for a Labour victory.

MOVING BEYOND THE CURRENT DEBATE



Source: Financial Times poll tracker

General election 2019 has three fundamental stories¹:

- The Tories successfully consolidated the Leave vote. This included approximately 700k to 800k direct switchers from Labour to the Conservative Party, particularly concentrated in the lost 'Red Wall' seats. A further number of 'stay at home' Labour Leave voters is also likely but further evidence is required as this is difficult to capture from post-election polling.
- The Remain vote split between Labour and other parties. 1.1m Labour Remain voters switched to other parties. But this was not the only story. While around 200k to 250k Labour (2017) Leave voters split away to these parties, more notable perhaps is the 300k Labour (2017) Remain voters that moved directly to the Tories despite Johnson's promise of a hard Brexit. This may have been due to concerns over Corbyn's leadership, a change of mind, or receptiveness to the idea of 'getting Brexit done', which appears to have been a very powerful Tory message.
- Jeremy Corbyn's leadership of the Labour Party was overwhelmingly unpopular with all of these lost voters and his overall approvals ratings were very low.

It is important to note that during the first half of

2019 Labour was within touching distance of the Tories, although they were both haemorrhaging votes to smaller parties with a clearer position on Brexit. The election of Boris Johnson as Tory leader in July immediately impacted on Conservative polling numbers, as Leave voters (including many former Labour voters) consolidated behind them. On the other hand Labour did not see a similar consolidation of Remain votes, and in particular saw little switching directly from Conservative Remain voters. The Tories recovered while Labour floundered.

Explaining this loss of voters has led to considerable debate within Labour since the general election. There are three main explanations that have been argued over. First, that Labour lost Leave voters because of its offer of a second referendum. Second, that the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn was to blame. Third, that the manifesto was too left wing or lacked credibility. There has already been much said on this by all sides.

Our intention is to move beyond this debate and look in greater granular detail at the peoples and places that Labour lost and how they might be won back. This reveals quite clear patterns that will shape the dangers and opportunities for the party going forward and the tasks facing whoever becomes the next leader.

¹ For more detailed analysis of the election results, see:

Dataprax, 2019. "Tory Landslide, Progressive Split" <https://www.dataprax.is/tory-landslide-progressives-split>

Paul Mason, 2019. "After Corbynism, where next for Labour?" <https://www.paulmason.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/After-Corbynism-v1.4.pdf>

WORKING CLASSES OLD AND NEW

Shifting nature of the Labour coalition

Labour faces a major challenge in dealing with some of the political and cultural consequences of regional inequalities in the UK. We know from existing research that the Leave vote, and by extension the strong Conservative showing in Leave areas in the 2019 General Election, has been closely correlated with ‘geographies of discontent’. These are towns and small cities that have struggled to recover since the 2008 financial crisis. As one study has put it, the Brexit vote can be seen in this respect as ‘the revenge of the places that don’t matter’.² Existing research has already started to profile these areas prior to the 2019 General Election. But the dramatic result, with a Tory landslide brought about by winning seats that have long been held by Labour, gives us additional evidence to profile the new divides of Brexit Britain.

Our new research confirms existing analyses of ‘geographies of discontent’. Notably they illustrate how the Tories have broken significant new ground at the 2019 general election. They now hold seats with higher than average levels of deprivation and low house prices, which is the exact opposite of the pattern in their traditional seats. Although on the national level the majority of the Leave vote was affluent and living in the south of England³, the important story of the last two elections is the way the Tories used Brexit to expand into Labour territory.

We took a range of demographic and socio-economic indicators and contrasted seats that Labour won in 2017 and 2019 for the first time with seats that the Conservatives won in these elections for the first time. We then compared this data to seats the Conservatives have consistently held and to the equivalent seats for the Labour Party.

The results expose a clear pattern (see charts, p8–9). We can divide these seats into four sets:

- **Multi-Ethnic Working Class Heartlands.** These are seats that Labour has consistently held despite the losses

seen in 2017 and 2019. They are centres for socio-economic inequality with high levels of deprivation.

- **Young Cosmopolitan Centres of the New Capitalism.** These are seats that Labour won for the first time in 2017 and 2019. They tend to have above average levels of ethnic diversity, high numbers of private renters and graduates, and fairly average levels of deprivation. They have higher than average concentration of the aspirational and socially liberal. These groups are well educated, but struggling with the impact of high rents and house prices.

- **The Brexit Voting Towns of Left Behind Britain.** These are seats the Tories won for the first time in 2017 and 2019. They are socio-economically declining towns and small cities with low levels of ethnic diversity that have struggled to find a new place for themselves in Britain’s post-industrial economy. They are older, have higher rates of home ownership on average and a greying population with higher than average numbers of pensioners. These seats voted to Leave.

- **The Affluent and Middle Class Conservative Shires.** These are seats that the Tories have consistently held and are not at risk from Labour. They are particularly notable for the contrast with the 2017 and 2019 Conservative gains. They tend to be much more affluent with high numbers of outright home ownership, higher house prices, and much lower levels of deprivation. They have low levels of ethnic diversity and high numbers of pensioners. The majority of these seats also voted to Leave.

The Tory gains in 2017 and 2019 have a clear demographic and socio-economic pattern. They tend to:

- Have a low level of ethnic diversity;
- Have average levels of home ownership;
- Tend to be ‘greying’ areas with a higher than average population of older people and below average to low population of younger people;
- Have below average population of graduates with

² http://eprints.lsc.ac.uk/85888/1/Rodriguez-Pose_Revenge%20of%20Places.pdf

³ See Dorling, <https://www.bmj.com/content/354/bmj.i3697>

	Labour consistently held seats	Labour gained from Con in GE2017 or GE2019	Con gained from Labour in GE2017 or GE2019	Conservative consistently held seats
Deprivation	Much higher than average levels of deprivation	Slightly lower than average levels of deprivation	Higher than average levels of deprivation	Much lower than average levels of deprivation
Housing	Low numbers own outright. High numbers of private renters. High levels of social housing. Fairly low numbers of ownership with a mortgage	Average numbers own outright. High numbers of private renters. Low levels of social housing. Average numbers of ownership with mortgage	Average numbers own outright. Low numbers of private renters. High levels of social housing. Average numbers of ownership with mortgage	High numbers own outright. Low numbers of renters. Very low levels of social housing. High numbers of ownership with mortgage
House prices	Below average	Average (though wide variation)	Substantially below average	Above average
Wages	Slightly below average	Average	Substantially below average	Above average
Age	High working age population Low numbers of pensioners	High working age population Quite low numbers of pensioners	Quite low working age population Quite high numbers of pensioners	Low working age population High numbers of pensioners
Ethnicity	Substantially above average BAME population	Above average BAME population	Below average BAME population	Below average BAME population
Education	Average numbers of graduates	Very high numbers of graduates	Very low numbers of graduates	Quite high numbers of graduates

university level or equivalent qualifications and higher than average percentage of population with no qualifications.

- They have much higher levels of deprivation than traditional Tory seats. While they still have lower levels of deprivation than safe Labour seats, they have higher levels than the seats Labour gained in 2017 and 2019.
- Interestingly, on average the median wage in these areas is lower than every other point of comparison in our sample. This is because safe Labour seats tend to have higher levels of inequality; deprivation, for example, and greater wealth sits 'on top of each other' in the Labour heartland of inner London.
- They also, unsurprisingly, have higher numbers of pensioners than Labour held seats, reflecting the deep generational divide in British politics.

The Tories' new electoral coalition is potentially unstable

In 2017 and 2019, the Tories established a new electoral coalition, which combines highly affluent and 'left behind' areas. The seats Tories have consistently held and the new Tory gains in 2017 and 2019 share two

key characteristics: they tend to be old and white. But beyond this there are significant differences. House prices are on average 46% lower in their 2017 and 2019 seats compared to their consistently held seats, reflecting lower rates of economic growth and opportunity. This means homeowners will not enjoy the same levels of consumer spending power as their equivalents in the Tory consistently held seats.

These are also low-wage local economies. Strikingly, we found that the median wage is actually lower in the 2017 and 2019 Tory gains than in any other of the three categories we analysed, including consistently held Labour seats. Even though the Labour's multi-ethnic working class heartlands have higher levels of socio-economic deprivation, the median wage is still higher than in the 2017 and 2019 Tory gains (as these tend to be high inequality seats, combining deprivation with a sizeable middle class). But it is equally notable that, at least in terms of their average wages, the seats Labour lost have more in common with the seats which Labour held than with constituencies in the Tory heartlands. Median wages in the 2017 and 2019 Tory

	Labour consistently held seats	Labour gained from Con in GE2017 or GE2019	Con gained from Labour in GE2017 or GE2019	Conservative consistently held seats
Deprivation (median rank out of 533)	108	233	133	375
% Outright ownership (mean)	25%	30%	32%	35%
% Private renters (mean)	19%	20%	13%	14%
% Social housing	24%	17%	20%	13%
% Ownership with mortgage	30%	32%	34%	35%
Median house price	£160,000	£200,000	£143,000	£265,000
Median weekly wage	£550	£580	£520	£600
% working age population (mean)	63%	62%	59%	58%
% Pensioners (mean)	15%	17%	20%	21%
% White (mean)	76%	86%	92%	93%
% Graduates (mean)	26%	31%	20%	28%

For a list of which seats were assigned to which category in these data tables, see appendix on p20

gains are on average 13% lower than in the seats that they have consistently held. The Tories' ability to keep this coalition united will be one of the decisive factors in whether they can keep hold of these gains at the next election. What can we expect?

- **Socially conservative policies.** As we come onto later in this report (p15), the Tories will continue to promote the socially conservative policies on issues like law and order, national security and immigration that appeal to the former Labour voters they won in 2019.

- **Pork-barrel politics.** Given that the Tories have committed to raising no taxes at all over the next five years and that tax receipts will not rise sharply given low to stagnant economic growth, it seems very unlikely that the Tories will deliver a high wage, high growth economic transformation in the Brexit voting towns of 'left behind' Britain. But within their existing budget constraints they are free to cynically target these seats for extra investment. We expect pork-barrel politics to become the norm with a series of symbolic

infrastructure investment decisions that favour the former 'red wall' seats.

The working class haven't abandoned Labour: it's a more complex picture

In the media the rise of the Tories in places like Blyth Valley, Mansfield, Barrow-in-Furness and Redcar has been popularly cast as a 'working class revolt' of the traditional Labour heartlands against its allegedly elitist, cosmopolitan orientation. However, we would argue that it is more accurate to talk about this as a transformation in the nature of the working class and Britain's economic geography. Brexit was not a 'working class revolt'⁴ but in many places it was driven by depressed economic conditions.

For example, take the levels of home ownership within these areas. House price growth tends to boost consumer confidence, as homeowners feel they have more money to spend. But as we have seen in the UK when they grow out of proportion to wages, it becomes much harder for people living in high value areas to

⁴ See Lorenza Antonucci article in *Renewal* journal https://www.lwbooks.co.uk/sites/default/files/renewal25.3-4_02antonucci.pdf

get on the property ladder at all. In contrast, in areas with weaker house price growth it is easier for more people to get into the housing market, but when they do so they will have lower levels of consumer confidence and their incomes may feel squeezed. In contrast, areas with very high property and rental costs can also have very high levels of child poverty. According to data from End Child Poverty, for example, Islington South and Finsbury has a child poverty rate (defined as 60% of the median income) of 52.2% – the sixth highest in the UK.⁵ Meanwhile, the average house price in the constituency was £683,850 in June 2019.⁶ Indeed, the commonly stated idea that Labour has lost touch with its working class base is wrong. Areas with high levels of deprivation and ethnic diversity remain solidly Labour in most of Britain.

For example, of the 20 constituencies with the highest levels of child poverty in Britain, 19 of them have a Labour MP in the new Parliament (see table on page 11); and Labour won in Peterborough, the only seat that does not, as recently as the 2019 by-election.

Labour is improving its performance in areas with higher levels of economic opportunity, numbers of graduates and rates of growth. But the wealth present in these areas can be deceptive, disguising very high rates of generational inequality between the young and old and the persistent presence of a large class of impoverished workers. These are also areas where property price rises have tended to outstrip wages with many middle-income earners unable to get on to the housing ladder.

We can see these changes as the emergence of a working class of a new type, more varied in its occupational profiles, including parts of the old professional and working classes, but increasingly attaching their interests to the socio-economic vision of the Labour Party. They are young families, renters, graduates, and ‘squeezed’ professional classes that tend towards social liberalism

and have a strong preference for the economic policies articulated by Labour. The new layers supplement a traditional core Labour vote, which is stronger than ever in many inner city areas.

There are a number of traditionally Conservative areas where this new coalition got Labour close to, or across, the winning margin despite the national picture in 2019: Kensington, Chingford and Woodford Green, Canterbury, and Brighton Kemptown, for example, are seats that were either won recently from the Tories or have narrow Tory majorities.

Labour can act now to build a profile of target seats where it would make sense to extend resources in the course of its rebuilding. A target list is needed that is both based on the last election result and takes into account these changing demographics:

- Larger than average numbers of private renters
- House prices running out of sync with wages
- Growing numbers of graduates
- Increasing levels of ethnic diversity
- Relatively young population, including younger families

However, Labour cannot win at a future general election without also recovering the ground that it lost this time around. This means it has to reach out to the ‘working classes old and new’ simultaneously.

⁵ <http://www.endchildpoverty.org.uk/poverty-in-your-area-2019/>

⁶ <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/social-policy/housing/constituency-dashboard/>

Of the 20 constituencies with the highest levels of child poverty in Britain, 19 of them have a Labour MP in the new Parliament

Constituency	% of children in poverty after housing costs 2017/18
Poplar and Limehouse	58.5%
Bethnal Green and Bow	55.3%
East Ham	53.8%
Birmingham, Hodge Hill	53.5%
Blackburn	52.4%
Islington South and Finsbury	52.2%
Manchester, Gorton	52.1%
Blackley and Broughton	51.3%
Bradford West	50.9%
West Ham	50.5%
Birmingham, Ladywood	49.6%
Peterborough	48.9%
Hackney South and Shoreditch	48.7%
Tottenham	48.6%
Edmonton	48.5%
Manchester Central	48.5%
Vauxhall	48.1%
Newcastle upon Tyne Central	48.0%
Hackney North and Stoke Newington	47.9%
Birmingham, Hall Green	47.2%

Source: endchildpoverty.org.uk

WHERE DID LABOUR LOSE ITS VOTES?

If we look more specifically at which groups of voters moved away from the party at this election we can see the problem. The narrative that Labour only lost the votes of working class voters, who switched to the Tories, is woefully simplistic. But the true picture is to some degree even more challenging. Labour actually lost votes across the board in every social class and nearly every age group. Whilst clearly many votes were lost directly to the Tories, in many demographic groups the movement of votes was towards the Liberal Democrats and other parties (generally SNP, Green or Plaid Cymru). For example, in the AB group of voters, the most affluent groups, both Labour and the Tories lost vote share, whilst the Lib Dems made significant gains. Labour lost large numbers of voters with no qualifications, mainly to the Tories, but also lost significant numbers of graduates with the Lib Dems benefiting most.

Social class

The traditional way of measuring occupational class is dated but not wholly redundant. Based on the NRS occupational grades system, it was developed for an industrial, not post-industrial, economy. It does not fit well with the new economy where many graduates undertake jobs that are seen as middle class but experience high levels of insecurity. This is reflected in the way politics has become detached from occupation to some degree with both parties now winning support in all groups.

Nonetheless, the data still provides an illustration of the challenge Labour faces. It *did* lose voters in the C2DE grades that denote the traditional working class. But it also lost votes in the ABC1 grades that refer to the upper and middle classes. We outline this data in the table on page 13, where the right hand column refers to changes in other parties, the centre to Labour's vote share, and the left to different groups based on social class, age, education, and housing.

A better way of talking about these changes is not a rise in support for the Conservatives among the traditional working class, but rather that social class as an indicator

of how people vote has become less important in the post-industrial economy. This means both parties' electoral coalitions are genuinely multi-class.

This is a long-term trend that we would expect to continue. Back in 2012 we already knew that the identification of the manual working class with Labour had fallen to about 40% – not far from its 39% vote share in the 2019 general election. The same study also found 'the proportion of all classes who do not identify with any party had risen substantially since 1984: for instance, in 2012, a third (31 per cent) of people in the semi or unskilled manual working classes does not identify with a particular party, compared with seven per cent in 1984'.⁷ These changes fit closely with other pieces of research that demonstrate an increasing fragility in political party identification.

Age

The trends to a general swing against Labour are also found among age groups. Labour's vote only stayed at the same level amongst 18 to 24 year olds. In all other age groups Labour suffered a swing against it to both the Tories and the Lib Dems.

Education and housing

We find similar trends in relation to education and housing. The private rental vote of the 'new', young working classes fell, with the Liberal Democrats and other parties benefiting. The graduate vote again fell with a similar pattern: to the Liberal Democrats and other parties. In contrast, those with no qualifications, which exist in higher proportions in Brexit-voting areas and are more likely to be in traditional working class jobs, swung heavily to the Conservatives as well as to other parties. There is also evidence in the rise of working class support amongst the Conservatives in the 7% increase in their vote share amongst social renters. This does look remarkable given their policy in this area. In addition, while Labour still has 45% of these voters, it suffered a very sharp fall among this group of voters, which the party has historically electorally dominated (with 57% voting Labour in 2017).

⁷ https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/38459/bsa30_social_class_final.pdf


Labour 2019 vote share

Change in Labour vote share

Change in other parties' vote share



Source: Ipsos Mori



Source: Lord Ashcroft Polls

The Brexit effect

The most important point about the 2019 election is also the most obvious. For as party-affiliations based on social class have declined, in the last decade they were replaced by a much more powerful and polarising cultural cleavage: between Leave and Remain. And the success of the Conservative Party in 2019 ultimately lay in its ability to capture an extremely large chunk of the vote on the Leave side. They augmented this with a further part of the vote: those that supported Remain but were accepting of Brexit. ‘Get Brexit Done’ was undoubtedly a powerful slogan with the latter as it very effectively appealed to the public exhaustion with the Brexit process.

It is important to recognise, however, that Brexit was not *designed* to destroy Labour’s electoral chances. The success of the ‘Tories’ messaging in the general election was not predetermined or inevitable. It is perfectly plausible that if Labour had the same position for a second referendum but with a different leader, or took this line at an earlier stage (e.g. September 2018 or January 2019) they could have asserted much more influence over these voters. If we go even further back,

Labour might have chosen to swing firmly behind membership of the single market between 2016 and 2018 at a time when this was being actively promoted by the main Remain campaign organisation, Open Britain. This may have averted it from being defined as not a ‘proper Brexit’. What is clear is that Jeremy Corbyn’s personal standing and approval ratings were undermined by Brexit (as well as other issues) and a large part of this was due to the perceived indecisiveness, lack of clarity and firm leadership.


THE NEW POLITICAL DIVIDES IN BRITAIN

Economics used to determine politics

Historically, support for political parties has been closely linked to left or right wing views on the economy. This distinction has been developed through the British Election Study and involves categorising responses on a scale according to these attitudes:

- Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation's wealth
- There is one law for the rich and one for the poor
- There is no need for strong trade unions to protect workers' rights
- Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems⁸

The graph below shows where the middle 50% of 2017 Tory and Labour voters sat along a left-right axis. As you can see, Labour supporters are clearly to the left.




However there has been a shift towards social attitudes becoming more important in determining party political support. This has been particularly true since the EU referendum, which split the country into broadly socially conservative Leave voters and socially liberal Remain voters. The British Election Study has similarly created an authoritarian/liberal cleavage defined by responses to the following statements:


- Young people don't have enough respect for traditional values
- Censorship is necessary to uphold moral values

- We should be tolerant of those who lead unconventional lifestyles
- For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence
- People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences⁹

The graph below shows where the middle 50% of 2017 Tory and Labour voters sit along an authoritarian vs liberal axis. Crucially, Labour voters have a substantially wider range of views than Tory voters as many hold 'authoritarian' social views.




This is a real problem for Labour. In May/June 2019 Labour was regularly polling around 20%, with half the people who had voted Labour in 2017 saying they intended to vote for another party. However, these lost voters held very divergent views on social issues, with those who planned to switch to the Lib Dems at the liberal end of the spectrum, but those planning to switch to the Brexit Party or the Conservatives towards the authoritarian end. This made it hard to appeal to both sides at once.



⁸ <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-left-right-divide/>

⁹ *ibid*


A similar chart for the Tories shows much less divergence between its different groups of switchers and when the General Election arrived, this made it easier for the Tories to persuade those voters to “come home”.



The impact of Brexit on the General Election

Much of the debate around Brexit (on both sides) became about values and identity rather than outcomes. This had a deeply polarising effect on the electorate, dividing it into Remain voters with generally liberal views and Leave voters who tended to be more socially conservative.

The Labour vote was overwhelmingly composed of Remain voters (as were the overwhelming majority of those who said they were going to vote for a different party in the summer of 2019).




Labour’s shift to backing a second referendum enabled the party to win back most (but not all) of those Remain voters back. If we had failed to do so, the defeat would have been even more catastrophic. As it was, Labour’s prevarications over Brexit meant that the party still lost more Remain voters than Leave voters in the General Election. Datapraxis estimates that 1.3 million 2017 Labour voters switched to Remain parties and around 1.1 million switched to the Conservatives or Brexit Party. Yet it is also true that in 52 out of the 60 seats we lost,

a majority had voted to Leave. Labour Leave voters were concentrated in Labour/Conservative marginal seats and tended to switch directly to the Tories, which was particularly damaging. Since polling evidence¹⁰ shows that Brexit was *not* the biggest reason for switching away from Labour, it is unlikely that most would have been won back by a change in Labour’s Brexit policy. Nevertheless, without regaining many of these voters, winning a General Election in the near future will be virtually impossible.

The shift towards ‘value based’ politics inevitably damages Labour

The Tories had faced much the same problem as Labour going into the 2019 General Election. Their vote was also split between Leave and Remain voters (about a third of 2017 Tory voters were 2016 Remain voters). But they did a better job of holding on both those who agreed with their Brexit policy and those who did not.

2017 vote/referendum vote



The Tories were helped by the trend towards party political support being determined by social attitudes as both their Remain and Leave voters cohere around the authoritarian end of the axis. Labour started off with a wider coalition, and with Jeremy Corbyn perceived (rightly or wrongly) as representing an ultra-liberal style of politics – the party alienated a portion of its socially conservative vote, much of which overlaps with those who voted for Leave.


This is not a problem which can easily be solved by going in the opposite direction, for example by embracing deliberately authoritarian rhetoric on issues such as immigration; Labour needs to bear in mind that

¹⁰ See Chris Curtis, YouGov <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/23/their-own-words-why-voters-abandoned-labour>

most of its votes come from liberals and will continue to do so. Meanwhile, broad demographic changes in the UK are generally shifting the country in a liberal direction (for example, views on immigration are softening).

The country supports progressive policies

Labour does hold one significant advantage – there is a growing consensus that the country’s problems need an interventionist government. When asked about Labour’s manifesto commitments to nationalisation and increased spending on public services, more people agreed that it was “right and proper to spend this kind of money” than believed it was simply unaffordable. The problem for Labour was that half of those who agreed with the *principle* of spending more did not trust the party to spend the money wisely.



This suggests the party should concentrate on offering believable, progressive outcomes and move the focus of attention away from debates over social values and identity. The new leader will need to be careful not to convey the impression that they are *either* ultra-liberal or ultra-authoritarian. Instead they should focus on developing the belief that the party can credibly deliver on its economic promises. In principle it should be possible for the party to maintain a socially liberal politics and develop carefully tailored messages, focusing on its economic offer, which might be able to win back voters on the softer end of the new authoritarian cleavage.

A lurch to more authoritarian policies and values would be wrong in principle. It would also create significant party management issues for the new leader given the membership are overwhelmingly socially liberal.¹¹

In terms of the wider electorate we also know from previous experience that credibility can be a factor in Labour’s positioning in relation to the authoritarian / social liberal cleavage too. Whether in the form of Gordon Brown’s ‘British jobs for British workers’ or Ed Miliband’s ‘one nation Labour’, more authoritarian inclined voters are likely to go on perceiving Labour as socially liberal no matter what concessions they make.

A repeat of the triangulation that led to the ‘scissors crisis’ in Labour’s 2019 loss of Leave and Remain voters could be repeated if Labour firmly abandoned the politics of social liberalism.

The fact that the UK will definitely be leaving the European Union offers an opportunity to re-focus the debate on what post-Brexit Britain will actually look like. Again, Labour needs to bear in mind that the vast majority of its support comes from Remain voters and should therefore be vigorously opposing the Tories’ hard Brexit policy. But it should do so on the basis of the outcomes for working people rather than on the basis of shared identity and values with the European project. While views around Brexit are for the time being highly entrenched, exogenous shocks – for example in relation to the economy if a hard Brexit has the negative economic effects widely anticipated – could lead to a fracturing in the 2019 Conservative coalition.

¹¹ Although this data is from 2016 we have no reason to believe the situation has changed since then. “Those voting in Labour’s leadership contest are socially very, very liberal. Only 22 per cent believe law-breakers should be given stiffer sentences and only 10 per cent support the death penalty. Some 84 per cent back gay marriage. They are also very positive about immigration. On a seven-point scale running from immigration being bad for the economy (1) to it being good for the economy (7), they score it at 5.74. On a similar scale which asks about the cultural benefits of immigration they come up, spookily enough, with exactly the same score.” <https://esrcpartymembersproject.org/2016/07/18/middle-class-university-graduates-will-decide-the-future-of-the-labour-party/>

AREAS REQUIRING MORE RESEARCH

We would make four further hypotheses about the patterns we see across the electorate in 2019, including the variation we find between constituencies:

- **Homeowners.** We suspect this played a greater role in the vote in some constituencies than might be suggested by the national averages. In 2017, the Conservative Party had a high profile manifesto announcement that led to a major media backlash and personal crisis for then Prime Minister Theresa May, the so-called ‘Dementia Tax’. Labour went on to win 30% of the vote among those that own their home outright, who are more likely to be old, and this fell by 8% in the 2019 election. While the national figures suggest the Tories were not the main beneficiary of the switching away from Labour amongst homeowners, it does not mean that Tory attack lines on Labour within specific seats had no utility. In particular, given the large numbers of home owners in Mansfield, Barrow and Furness and Blyth Valley (seats we profile in Part 2 of this report) it seems plausible that the Tory disinformation around Labour proposals like the ‘Land for the Many’ report¹² may have cut through in these seats and served to consolidate or grow the Tory vote.

- **Security and resistance to change.** There may well be a further issue about the self-conception of personal economic security and support for political change. A remark often made about the Leave-voting former Labour seats is that Brexit was a ‘cry for change’. But it might be analytically lazy to just accept this argument, which is commonly heard in the Labour Party. The Brexit vote could also be seen as an act of resistance to change and a perceived ‘uprooting’ of lives. For example, in areas experiencing economic stagnation or decline there might be a strong desire to go ‘back’ to an earlier time seen as better, not forwards to the uncertainties of the ‘Green Industrial Revolution’ and other Labour offers (this is not an argument against such policies but an observation about the frames that may filter them). Similarly, it is often argued on the left that Remain was the status quo opposition in the referendum. But this does not actually fit with the Vote Leave campaign’s chosen messaging. These often focused on the EU as a threat to the norms of British life. When they falsely warned that 80m Turkish immigrants would soon be arriving in the UK, for example, they were claiming the EU was a threat to the

British status quo. The notion of taking *back* control also appealed to the idea of a previous era when Britain was a sovereign nation.

- **Insecurity and receptiveness to change.** There is likely to be a further dynamic at play in areas with robust economic growth, higher than average wages, but also high property and rental prices. These are areas that are already experiencing high levels of social change; and this may make it easier for individuals to adapt to the idea of change in general. Higher than average earners in these areas may also be experiencing economic insecurity as their levels of disposable income are squeezed by higher living costs. Taken together this is likely to make them more receptive to Labour’s offer. By contrast homeowners on lower incomes in Leave voting areas may experience lower levels of economic insecurity, even though the opportunities present in their towns are more restricted. Overall we believe these changes are contributing to the transformation of the traditional Labour electorate.

- **The likely appeal of Tory messaging.** The Tories hammered home the ‘cost of Corbyn’. The Labour response arguably had two potential flaws. On the one hand, where it was heavily transactional it undermined the party’s credibility by failing to say clearly who would pay the costs of an expansive fiscal policy. The Waspi women pledge, for example, broke with the Fiscal Credibility Rule and reinforced the idea that someone would be left with the bill for a Labour government without clarifying who would pick it up.¹³ On the other hand, the party has a strong offer for key parts of its continued core support amongst the severely disadvantaged (e.g. bedroom tax, zero hours, homelessness and universal credit). And this also has wider appeal amongst parts of the electorate that have a moral concern with rising impoverishment even if they are unaffected by it themselves. However, this moral appeal seems unlikely to register strongly with what we know already about the more socially conservative voters Labour needs. But they might respond to a Labour Party seen as credibly representing the interests of the home owning but squeezed middle with the policies to deliver a high wage economy. This implies the party should retain its economic policy, but needs to find a way of conveying it as a more pragmatic, ‘common sense’ step for the four nations.

¹² For the original report, see https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/12081_19-Land-for-the-Many.pdf

For an example of the misinformation campaign, see <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7100811/Labour-unveil-taxes-homeowners-garden-forces-sale-land-cheap.html>

¹³ <https://novaramedia.com/2019/12/17/labours-economic-plans-what-went-wrong/>

RECOMMENDATIONS

It's economics (and democracy), stupid

It should be possible to win back a significant portion of Labour's lost socially conservative leaning vote. They were, after all, prepared to vote for Jeremy Corbyn's Labour party as recently as 2017. Furthermore, they are broadly supportive of progressive economic policies. But if political discussions remain focused on questions of values and identity, this will benefit the Tories.

We make the following simple recommendations to the incoming party leadership:

- **Resist Johnson's Brexit, but move on from Leave/Remain.** A new leader should avoid getting dragged back into a Leave/Remain divide (e.g. by moving to a 'rejoin' position). They should concentrate on resisting Johnson's hard Brexit, holding the Tories to account for the outcomes they will fail to deliver and demonstrating how a Labour government will do better.
- **See what works. Adopt an evidence-based approach to policy making.** We would strongly recommend an evidence-based approach, which utilises traditional methods such as focus groups with new techniques such as survey experiments using Implicit Response Testing to measure the emotional resonance of key messages. With a professional approach to targeting these lost voters, messages can be carefully honed in ways that make our radical policies appealing.

- **Avoid making shallow appeals to these voters.** There is a recent Labour Party history of shallow appeals to these types of voters that appear false and unconvincing; for example, 'one nation Labour' and 'British jobs for British workers'. This is self-defeating as it moves the debate back onto the values and identity terrain that Labour *cannot win on*. These voters are only likely to see these attempts as insincere and they will tend to reinforce Tory frames. Labour is always likely to be seen as a social liberal party for the obvious reason that *it is* a social liberal party. Moves in this direction may also undermine other parts of Labour's electoral coalition and restrict its growth potential.

- **Focus on economic policy and democracy.** Investment in our regions and localities, publicly owned rail and utilities, the NHS, etc. These issues all have broad, popular appeal. The sense of political disempowerment is also an important factor in the discontent that led to Brexit. Labour can combine a strong economic offer with a message retooling our democracy and making politics work in our localities. If voters believe we can credibly deliver on this agenda, then we can still win in 2024. With this 'big tent' approach based on democracy and economics Labour can gather together the 14m votes we need.

APPENDIX

Seat categorisations

The following seats were placed into four categories in the process of compiling the data tables on p8–9:

Consistently held Conservative seats

Aberconwy	Chingford and Woodford Green	Hendon	North West Hampshire
Aldershot	Chippenham	Henley	North West Leicestershire
Aldridge-Brownhills	Chipping Barnet	Hereford and South Herefordshire	North West Norfolk
Altrincham and Sale West	Christchurch	Hertford and Stortford	North Wiltshire
Amber Valley	Cities Of London and Westminster	Hertsmere	Norwich North
Arundel and South Downs	Cleethorpes	Hexham	Nuneaton
Ashford	Clwyd West	Hitchin and Harpenden	Old Bexley and Sidcup
Aylesbury	Colchester	Hornchurch and Upminster	Orpington
Banbury	Congleton	Horsham	Pendle
Basildon and Billericay	Corby	Huntingdon	Penrith and The Border
Basingstoke	Crawley	Isle Of Wight	Plymouth Moor View
Beaconsfield	Croydon South	Kenilworth and Southam	Poole
Beckenham	Dartford	Kettering	Portsmouth North
Berwick-Upon-Tweed	Daventry	Kingswood	Preseli Pembrokeshire
Beverley and Holderness	Derbyshire Dales	Lewes	Pudsey
Bexhill and Battle	Devizes	Lichfield	Rayleigh and Wickford
Bexleyheath and Crayford	Dover	Loughborough	Reading West
Blackpool North and Cleveleys	Dudley South	Louth and Horncastle	Redditch
Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	Dumfriesshire Clydesdale and Tweeddale	Ludlow	Reigate
Bolton West	East Devon	Macclesfield	Ribble Valley
Boston and Skegness	East Hampshire	Maidenhead	Richmond (Yorks)
Bosworth	Eastleigh	Maidstone and The Weald	Rochester and Strood
Bournemouth East	East Surrey	Maldon	Rochford and Southend East
Bournemouth West	East Worthing and Shoreham	Meon Valley	Romford
Bracknell	East Yorkshire	Meriden	Romsey and Southampton North
Braintree	Eddisbury	Mid Bedfordshire	Rossendale and Darwen
Brecon and Radnorshire	Elmet and Rothwell	Mid Derbyshire	Rugby
Brentwood and Ongar	Epping Forest	Mid Dorset and North Poole	Ruislip Northwood and Pinner
Bridgwater and West Somerset	Epsom and Ewell	Mid Norfolk	Runnymede and Weybridge
Brigg and Goole	Erewash	Mid Sussex	Rushcliffe
Broadland	Esher and Walton	Mid Worcestershire	Rutland and Melton
Bromley and Chislehurst	Fareham	Milton Keynes North	Saffron Walden
Bromsgrove	Faversham and Mid Kent	Milton Keynes South	Salisbury
Broxbourne	Filton and Bradley Stoke	Mole Valley	Scarborough and Whitby
Broxtowe	Finchley and Golders Green	Monmouth	Selby and Ainsty
Burton	Folkestone and Hythe	Montgomeryshire	Sevenoaks
Bury St Edmunds	Forest Of Dean	Morecambe and Lunesdale	Sherwood
Calder Valley	Fylde	Morley and Outwood	Shipley
Camborne and Redruth	Gainsborough	Newark	Shrewsbury and Atcham
Cannock Chase	Gillingham and Rainham	Newbury	Sittingbourne and Sheppey
Carlisle	Gloucester	New Forest East	Skipton and Ripon
Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire	Gosport	New Forest West	Sleaford and North Hykeham
Castle Point	Grantham and Stamford	Newton Abbot	Solihull
Central Devon	Gravesham	Northampton North	Somerton and Frome
Central Suffolk and North Ipswich	Great Yarmouth	Northampton South	Southampton Itchen
Charnwood	Guildford	North Cornwall	South Basildon and East Thurrock
Chatham and Aylesford	Halesowen and Rowley Regis	North Devon	South Cambridgeshire
Cheadle	Haltemprice and Howden	North Dorset	South Derbyshire
Chelmsford	Harborough	North East Bedfordshire	South Dorset
Chelsea and Fulham	Harlow	North East Cambridgeshire	South East Cambridgeshire
Cheltenham	Harrogate and Knaresborough	North East Hampshire	South East Cornwall
Chesham and Amersham	Harrow East	North East Hertfordshire	Southend West
Chichester	Harwich and North Essex	North East Somerset	South Holland and The Deepings
	Hastings and Rye	North Herefordshire	South Leicestershire
	Havant	North Shropshire	South Norfolk
	Hazel Grove	North Somerset	South Northamptonshire
	Hemel Hempstead	North Swindon	South Ribble
		North Thanet	
		North Warwickshire	
		North West Cambridgeshire	

	Con gained from Labour in GE2017 or GE2019	Labour gained from Con in GE2017 or GE2019	Consistently held Labour seats
South Staffordshire	Ashfield	Battersea	Aberavon
South Suffolk	Barrow and Furness	Bedford	Alyn and Deeside
South Swindon	Bassetlaw	Brighton Kemptown	Ashton-Under-Lyne
South Thanet	Birmingham Northfield	Bristol North West	Barking
South West Bedfordshire	Bishop Auckland	Bury North	Barnsley Central
South West Devon	Blackpool South	Canterbury	Barnsley East
South West Hertfordshire	Blyth Valley	Cardiff North	Batley and Spen
South West Norfolk	Bolsover	Colne Valley	Bermondsey and Old
South West Surrey	Bolton North East	Crewe and Nantwich	Southwark
South West Wiltshire	Bridgend	Croydon Central	Bethnal Green and Bow
Spelthorne	Burnley	Derby North	Birkenhead
Stafford	Bury South	Enfield Southgate	Birmingham Edgbaston
Staffordshire Moorlands	Clwyd South	Gower	Birmingham Erdington
St Austell and Newquay	Copeland	High Peak	Birmingham Hall Green
Stevenage	Darlington	Ipswich	Birmingham Hodge Hill
St Ives	Delyn	Keighley	Birmingham Ladywood
Stone	Dewsbury	Kensington	Birmingham Perry Barr
Stourbridge	Don Valley	Lincoln	Birmingham Selly Oak
Stratford-On-Avon	Dudley North	Peterborough	Birmingham Yardley
Suffolk Coastal	Gedling	Plymouth Sutton and	Blackburn
Surrey Heath	Great Grimsby	Devonport	Blackley and Broughton
Sutton and Cheam	Heywood and Middleton	Portsmouth South	Blaenau Gwent
Sutton Coldfield	Hyndburn	Putney	Blaydon
Tamworth	Leigh	Reading East	Bolton South East
Tatton	Mansfield	Stockton South	Bootle
Taunton Deane	Middlesbrough South and	Stroud	Bradford East
Telford	East Cleveland	Vale Of Clwyd	Bradford South
Tewkesbury	Newcastle-Under-Lyme	Warrington South	Bradford West
The Cotswolds	North East Derbyshire	Warwick and Leamington	Brent Central
The Wrekin	North West Durham	Weaver Vale	Brentford and Isleworth
Thirsk and Malton	Penistone and Stocksbridge		Brent North
Thornbury and Yate	Redcar		Bristol East
Thurrock	Rother Valley		Bristol South
Tiverton and Honiton	Scunthorpe		Bristol West
Tonbridge and Malling	Sedgefield		Caerphilly
Torbay	Stoke-On-Trent Central		Camberwell and Peckham
Torridge and West Devon	Stoke-On-Trent North		Cambridge
Totnes	Stoke-On-Trent South		Cardiff Central
Truro and Falmouth	Wakefield		Cardiff South and Penarth
Tunbridge Wells	Walsall North		Cardiff West
Uxbridge and South Ruislip	West Bromwich East		Chesterfield
Vale Of Glamorgan	West Bromwich West		City Of Chester
Wantage	Wolverhampton North East		City Of Durham
Watford	Wolverhampton South West		Coventry North East
Waveney	Workington		Coventry North West
Wealden	Wrexham		Coventry South
Wellingborough	Ynys Mon		Croydon North
Wells			Cynon Valley
Welwyn Hatfield			Dagenham and Rainham
West Dorset			Denton and Reddish
Weston-Super-Mare			Derby South
West Suffolk			Doncaster Central
West Worcestershire			Doncaster North
Wimbledon			Dulwich and West Norwood
Winchester			Ealing Central and Acton
Windsor			Ealing North
Witham			Ealing Southall
Witney			Easington
Woking			East Ham
Wokingham			Edinburgh South
Worcester			Edmonton
Worthing West			Ellesmere Port and Neston
Wycombe			Eltham
Wyre and Preston North			Enfield North
Wyre Forest			Erith and Thamesmead
Yeovil			Exeter
York Outer			Feltham and Heston
			Garston and Halewood

Gateshead
Greenwich and Woolwich
Hackney North and Stoke Newington
Hackney South and Shoreditch
Halifax
Halton
Hammersmith
Hampstead and Kilburn
Harrow West
Hartlepool
Hayes and Harlington
Hemsworth
Holborn and St Pancras
Hornsey and Wood Green
Houghton and Sunderland South
Hove
Huddersfield
Ilford North
Ilford South
Islington North
Islington South and Finsbury
Islwyn
Jarrow
Kingston upon Hull East
Kingston upon Hull North
Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle
Knowsley
Lancaster and Fleetwood
Leeds Central
Leeds East
Leeds North East
Leeds West
Leicester East
Leicester South
Leicester West
Lewisham Deptford
Lewisham East
Lewisham West and Penge
Leyton and Wanstead
Liverpool Riverside
Liverpool Walton
Liverpool Wavertree
Liverpool West Derby
Llanelli
Luton North
Luton South
Makerfield
Manchester Central
Manchester Gorton
Manchester Withington
Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney
Middlesbrough
Mitcham and Morden
Neath
Newcastle Upon Tyne Central
Newcastle Upon Tyne East
Newcastle Upon Tyne North
Newport East
Newport West
Normanton Pontefract and Castleford
North Durham
North Tyneside
Norwich South
Nottingham East
Nottingham North
Nottingham South
Ogmore
Oldham East and Saddleworth
Oldham West and Royton
Oxford East
Pontypridd

Poplar and Limehouse
Preston
Rhondda
Rochdale
Rotherham
Salford and Eccles
Sefton Central
Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough
Sheffield Central
Sheffield Heeley
Sheffield South East
Slough
Southampton Test
South Shields
Stalybridge and Hyde
St Helens North
St Helens South and Whiston
Stockport
Stockton North
Streatham
Stretford and Urmston
Sunderland Central
Swansea East
Swansea West
Tooting
Torfaen
Tottenham
Tynemouth
Vauxhall
Wallasey
Walsall South
Walthamstow
Wansbeck
Warley
Warrington North
Washington and Sunderland West
Wentworth and Dearne
West Ham
West Lancashire
Westminster North
Wigan
Wirral South
Wirral West
Wolverhampton South East
Worsley and Eccles South
Wythenshawe and Sale East
York Central

